Moral Truth in a Plural World: A Critical Synthetic Realist Account of Value, Finitude, and Human Judgment

By Januarius Asongu

Contemporary moral inquiry is marked by a persistent tension between claims to objective moral truth and the realities of human finitude, cultural pluralism, and historical contingency. Robust moral realism promises normativity and critique but is often charged with dogmatism or moral imperialism; anti-realist and constructivist approaches illuminate the interpretive character of valuation but risk dissolving moral authority into preference, convention, or power. This article argues that Critical Synthetic Realism (CSR) provides a more adequate framework for moral truth in plural societies. CSR affirms that values are objective features of reality while insisting that human access to value is mediated, fallible, and historically situated. By integrating ontological realism with epistemic fallibilism, hermeneutic consciousness, and pragmatic testing in lived social life, CSR avoids both absolutism and relativism. The framework explains persistent moral disagreement without surrendering truth, justifies cross-cultural critique without moral imperialism, and accounts for moral learning and progress. The paper concludes by demonstrating CSR’s relevance for applied ethics—especially corporate responsibility, environmental stewardship, and public moral discourse—reframing moral inquiry as a truth- seeking practice characterized by conviction without arrogance and humility without nihilism.