By Prof. Januarius Asongu

Abstract

The doctrine of papal and ecclesial infallibility remains one of the most contested teachings within modern Christian theology. While defenders of infallibility argue that the doctrine safeguards doctrinal continuity and ecclesial unity, critics contend that it risks insulating institutions from historical accountability, epistemic humility, and theological development. This article examines the doctrine of infallibility through the lens of Critical Synthetic Realism (CSR), a philosophical and theological framework I have developed over the course of several recent works. CSR combines metaphysical realism, epistemic fallibilism, interdisciplinary synthesis, and a theory of "epistemic fracture" to argue that all human knowing—including institutional and ecclesial knowing—remains historically situated and vulnerable to distortion. Drawing from classical Catholic theology, Vatican I and II, liberation theology, contemporary synodal ecclesiology, critical realism, and recent debates surrounding synodality under Pope Francis, I argue that CSR generates substantial philosophical tension with maximalist interpretations of infallibility while preserving a strong commitment to objective truth, revelation, and ecclesial authority. Rather than embracing relativism, I propose a model of "critical ecclesial realism" in which the Church is understood as a Spirit-guided but historically conditioned community continually engaged in epistemic purification. I conclude that CSR is more compatible with notions of indefectibility, communal discernment, and developmental truth than with rigidly absolutist models of doctrinal irreformability.

Keywords: Critical Synthetic Realism, epistemic fracture, infallibility, fallibilism, synodality, ecclesiology, Catholic theology, magisterium, truth, doctrinal development, Hans Küng

Introduction

The question of ecclesial infallibility has returned to the center of theological debate in the twenty-first century. The ongoing Synod on Synodality, renewed discussions concerning episcopal collegiality, controversies surrounding papal authority, and intensified scrutiny of institutional failures within the Roman Catholic Church have all reopened questions concerning the nature and limits of ecclesial certainty. As I have argued elsewhere, "the Church is being compelled to rediscover her identity once inherited privilege no longer shields her from the demands of truth, accountability, and conversion" (Asongu, 2026d, p. 1).

The doctrine of papal infallibility, formally articulated at the First Vatican Council in Pastor Aeternus (1870), emerged partly in response to the epistemic and political fragmentation of modernity. The doctrine sought to provide a stable locus of doctrinal authority amid rising liberalism, nationalism, rationalism, and skepticism (Vatican Council I, 1870). Yet the very conditions that gave rise to infallibility also generated new critiques of centralized ecclesial certainty. Contemporary theology increasingly confronts the tension between institutional authority and epistemic humility, especially within historically conscious and globally pluralistic contexts.

In this article, I argue that the philosophical framework of Critical Synthetic Realism (CSR)—a framework I have developed systematically in my recent work—introduces a particularly significant challenge to strong formulations of infallibility. As I have articulated in Critical Synthetic Realism: A Systematic Philosophy of Truth, Personhood, and Human Flourishing (Asongu, 2026a), CSR affirms ontological realism and objective truth while simultaneously insisting upon the fallibility, historicity, and vulnerability of all human knowing. Central to CSR is the concept of "epistemic fracture," which I define as the claim that distortion penetrates human cognition, institutions, cultures, and systems of knowledge (Asongu, 2026b). Within such a framework, no human institution—including ecclesial institutions—can be understood as entirely immune from historical limitation or epistemic distortion.

The central thesis of this article is not that CSR necessarily rejects all notions of ecclesial authority or doctrinal reliability. Rather, I contend that CSR challenges triumphalist or absolutist interpretations of infallibility while opening the possibility for a more historically conscious, communal, and developmental account of ecclesial truth. I therefore propose that CSR is more compatible with notions of ecclesial indefectibility, synodal discernment, and developmental truth than with rigidly static conceptions of doctrinal irreformability.

This article proceeds in six stages. First, I review major theological and philosophical literature on infallibility, fallibilism, and ecclesial authority, with particular attention to the contributions of Hans Küng. Second, I outline the methodological assumptions of the Critical Synthetic Realist Methodology (CSRM) as I have developed it. Third, I examine the philosophical tensions between CSR and classical formulations of infallibility. Fourth, I analyze Küng's challenge to infallibility and assess its strengths and limitations from a CSR perspective. Fifth, I engage contemporary theological debates concerning synodality and ecclesial discernment. Finally, I propose a constructive model of "critical ecclesial realism" rooted in my broader philosophical framework.

Literature Review

Classical Foundations of Infallibility

The doctrine of infallibility possesses deep roots in Catholic ecclesiology, though its formal dogmatic articulation emerged relatively late. Classical defenses of Petrine authority drew heavily from Matthew 16:18–19, Luke 22:32, and John 21:15–17. Thomas Aquinas defended the unique role of ecclesial authority in preserving doctrinal unity, though his ecclesiology lacked the later ultramontane centralization associated with Vatican I (Aquinas, 1947).

John Henry Newman significantly complicated static understandings of doctrine through his theory of doctrinal development. Newman argued that authentic doctrinal continuity often involves historical development rather than merely static repetition (Newman, 1878). This insight remains foundational for contemporary Catholic theology because it implicitly acknowledges historical growth within ecclesial understanding. As Newman (1878) famously observed, "By the Church of England a hollow uniformity is preferred to an infallible chair; and by the sects of England an interminable division. Germany and Geneva began with persecution and have ended in skepticism. The doctrine of infallibility is a less violent hypothesis than this sacrifice either of faith or of charity" (p. 89).

The formal doctrine of papal infallibility articulated in Pastor Aeternus defined infallibility narrowly under specified conditions, namely when the pope speaks ex cathedra on matters of faith and morals (Vatican Council I, 1870). Vatican I declared that when the Roman Pontiff speaks ex cathedra—"that is, when carrying out the duty of the pastor and teacher of all Christians in accord with his supreme apostolic authority he explains a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church, through the divine assistance promised him in blessed Peter, operates with that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer wished that His church be instructed in defining doctrine on faith and morals" (Vatican Council I, 1870, chap. 4). Yet subsequent Catholic reception frequently expanded popular understandings of infallibility beyond these precise limits, sometimes producing what critics describe as "maximalist papalism" (Oakes, 2009; Powell, 2009). In my own assessment, this expansion reflects what I have elsewhere called "epistemic overreach"—the tendency of institutions to extend their authority beyond domains in which they possess legitimate competence (Asongu, 2026a, p. 179).

Vatican II and Ecclesial Development

The Second Vatican Council introduced a more communal and historically conscious ecclesiology. Lumen Gentium emphasized the Church as the "People of God" and balanced papal primacy with episcopal collegiality (Second Vatican Council, 1964). Scholars such as Yves Congar and Karl Rahner argued that ecclesial authority must be understood within the broader life of the Church rather than as isolated juridical supremacy (Congar, 2011; Rahner, 1981). As I have noted in Fire from the Margins, "Vatican II articulated a pilgrim ecclesiology, emphasized historical discernment, and gestured toward authority exercised through listening and shared responsibility. Its limitations lie not in its theology but in its partial assimilation" (Asongu, 2026d, p. 3).

Significantly, Vatican II articulated criteria for the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, stating that "although the bishops individually do not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, they nevertheless proclaim the teaching of Christ infallibly, even when they are dispersed throughout the world, provided that they remain in communion with each other and with the successor of Peter and that in authoritatively teaching on a matter of faith and morals they agree in one judgment as that to be held definitively" (Second Vatican Council, 1964, para. 25; cited in Grisez, 1985, p. 249).

Recent scholarship has intensified this trajectory through renewed emphasis on synodality. John Stayne (2024) argues that contemporary synodal theology offers the possibility of integrating infallibility more deeply within the communal life of the Church rather than treating the pope as existing above ecclesial discernment. Similarly, Massimo Faggioli (2024) argues that synodality reflects a continuing effort to balance Vatican I's emphasis on primacy with Vatican II's emphasis on collegiality. I find this trajectory promising, though I have also expressed caution about the gap between synodality's theological aspirations and its structural implementation (Asongu, 2026c).

Under Pope Francis, synodality has emerged as a defining ecclesiological theme. Pope Francis (2013) has called for a "conversion of the papacy" and a "healthy decentralization" that allows local churches greater freedom (para. 32). Yet synodality itself has generated intense controversy, particularly among theologians concerned that excessive openness could destabilize doctrinal continuity. As Sister Renée Mirkes (2021) observes, any assessment of synodality must respect "the prudential tension of two standards: the old Latin principle abusus non tollit usum (i.e., just because the idea of synodality could be abused should not prohibit attempts to realize it) and the norm of Ronald Reagan: 'trust but verify'" (para. 12). I have addressed this tension directly in Beyond Doctrine, where I argue that "synodality is not a replacement for hierarchy; it is a recontextualization of it" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 186).

Hans Küng and the Challenge to Infallibility

No discussion of infallibility in contemporary Catholic theology can be complete without sustained engagement with Hans Küng (1928–2021), the Swiss Catholic theologian whose 1970 book Infallible? An Inquiry precipitated one of the most significant theological controversies of the post-conciliar period. Küng's challenge was not merely academic; it struck at the heart of Catholic ecclesial self-understanding and led eventually to the revocation of his missio canonica (the permission to teach as a Catholic theologian) in 1979.

The Argument of Infallible? An Inquiry

Küng's (1971) central thesis was both simple and devastating: the doctrine of papal and conciliar infallibility is not only unscriptural and historically problematic but also logically incoherent. Küng argued that the Church's claim to infallibility cannot be reconciled with the undeniable fact that ecclesial teachings have changed and developed over time—and sometimes have been reversed. "If the Church," Küng wrote, "can be mistaken in its official teaching, then it cannot be infallible. If it cannot be mistaken, then it must be infallible. But history shows that the Church has been mistaken" (Küng, 1971, p. 28).

Küng distinguished carefully between indefectibility (the Church's lasting faithfulness to the Gospel) and infallibility (immunity from error in official teaching). He affirmed the former while denying the latter. Drawing extensively on historical examples—the condemnation of Galileo, the reversal of teaching on usury, the development of doctrine on religious liberty—Küng demonstrated that even solemn ecclesial pronouncements have been corrected or abandoned. "The Church remains faithful to the Gospel not because it never errs," Küng argued, "but because it can repent of its errors and reform itself" (Küng, 1971, p. 126).

What made Küng's argument particularly threatening to the Vatican was not its novelty—similar critiques had been advanced by Protestant theologians for centuries—but its source. Küng was not an outsider attacking the Church; he was a peritus (expert adviser) at Vatican II, a respected theologian, and a fellow Swiss of the new Pope John Paul II. His argument was internal, drawing on Catholic sources and addressed to Catholic audiences. This made it impossible to dismiss as mere Protestant polemic.

The Vatican's Response and Küng's Marginalization

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, under the leadership of Cardinal Franjo Šeper (and later Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger), initiated an investigation of Küng's work. In 1975, the CDF issued a declaration stating that Küng's views on infallibility "depart from the teaching of the Catholic Church in a very significant way" (CDF, 1975). The declaration did not explicitly revoke Küng's missio canonica but warned that continued deviation would have consequences.

In 1979, the Vatican formally declared that Küng "could no longer be considered a Catholic theologian" and revoked his permission to teach Catholic theology (CDF, 1979). The declaration was remarkable for its starkness: "In his writings, Hans Küng has departed from the integral truth of the Catholic faith, and therefore he can no longer be considered a Catholic theologian nor function as such in a teaching role" (cited in McBrien, 2003, p. 345). Küng retained his position at the University of Tübingen, but he was removed from the Catholic Theological Faculty and reassigned to the Institute for Ecumenical Research, which he directed until his retirement in 1996.

The Vatican's action had a chilling effect on Catholic theological discourse. As Richard McBrien (2003) has observed, "The silencing of Küng sent a clear message to Catholic theologians worldwide: certain questions were off-limits, and challenging the doctrine of infallibility was among them" (p. 346). For nearly two decades following the Küng affair, Catholic theological discussion of infallity was markedly restrained.

Strengths of Küng's Position

From the perspective of CSR, several elements of Küng's position merit serious consideration.

First, Küng's historical method demonstrated the contingency of ecclesial teaching. By showing that even solemn definitions have emerged from particular historical contexts and have sometimes been corrected, Küng challenged the notion that doctrinal formulations transcend historical conditioning. As I have argued in Epistemic Sovereignty, "all knowledge is historically mediated. No institution, including the Church, can claim exemption from this condition" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 45). Küng's historical work provided empirical support for this epistemological claim.

Second, Küng's distinction between infallibility and indefectibility is theologically sound and philosophically defensible. Indefectibility—the promise that the Church will not finally abandon the Gospel—requires no claim to immunological error-freedom. It requires only that the Spirit remains with the Church, enabling repentance and reform. As Küng (1971) wrote, "The Church is not infallible because it is holy; it is holy because it is constantly being forgiven and renewed" (p. 178). This aligns with my own emphasis on epistemic humility as a theological virtue (Asongu, 2026b).

Third, Küng correctly identified the psychological and pastoral problems associated with maximalist interpretations of infallibility. When the Church claims error-free teaching authority, any admission of error becomes institutionally catastrophic. The result is institutional defensiveness, cover-ups, and the suppression of dissent—dynamics that have contributed significantly to the Church's credibility crises. In Beyond Doctrine, I have argued that "the Church that cannot admit error cannot repent; the Church that cannot repent cannot be forgiven; the Church that cannot be forgiven cannot proclaim the Gospel of forgiveness" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 201).

Fourth, Küng anticipated the synodal turn that would emerge decades later under Pope Francis. Küng argued that infallibility cannot be the property of the pope alone; if the Church is infallible at all, its infallibility must reside in the whole community of the faithful (the sensus fidelium), not in a single office. This emphasis on communal discernment aligns with my own advocacy for synodality as a constitutive dimension of ecclesial life (Asongu, 2026c, 2026d).

Limitations of Küng's Position

However, from a CSR perspective, Küng's position also exhibits significant limitations.

First, Küng's critique of infallibility sometimes veered toward an epistemological relativism that CSR cannot accept. Küng argued that because all human knowledge is historically conditioned, no claim to truth can be absolute. But this argument conflates the finitude and fallibility of human knowing with the relativity of truth itself. As I have argued in Critical Synthetic Realism, "the recognition that knowledge is mediated does not entail the conclusion that reality is constructed. The world pushes back against interpretation, and that pushback—the constraint of reality—is what distinguishes knowledge from mere opinion" (Asongu, 2026a, p. 91). Küng's position sometimes collapsed into a historicism that made truth indistinguishable from the consensus of the present moment.

Second, Küng's proposal for a "Church of the Word" that would abandon all claims to infallible teaching authority was theologically underdeveloped and institutionally naïve. If the Church cannot claim to teach with authority about matters of faith and morals, what distinguishes it from any voluntary association of religious seekers? Küng's answer—that the Church should proclaim the Word of God without claiming infallible interpretation—ignores the hermeneutical problem: all proclamation involves interpretation, and interpretation involves claims about meaning and truth. As Avery Dulles (1987) observed in his critique of Küng, "A Church that cannot claim to teach infallibly can still claim to teach authoritatively. But Küng failed to articulate a positive account of what ecclesial authority would mean if infallibility were abandoned" (p. 89). In CSR terms, Küng did not provide an account of how authoritative teaching can function under conditions of epistemic fracture.

Third, Küng's argument was primarily negative and deconstructive. He was exceptionally skilled at demonstrating the weaknesses of the infallibility doctrine, but he offered only the barest sketch of what a post-infallible Catholicism might look like. His later work on "global ethics" and interreligious dialogue, while valuable, did not fill this lacuna. As I have argued in Beyond Doctrine, critique without construction is insufficient. "The task of theology is not merely to deconstruct problematic doctrines but to reconstruct faithful alternatives" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 178).

Fourth, Küng's treatment of Scripture was problematic. He appealed to the New Testament as a norm against later ecclesial developments, but he did not adequately address the question of how the New Testament itself claims authority. If all claims to infallibility are suspect, why should the New Testament's authority be immune from the same critique? Küng attempted to ground ecclesial teaching in Scripture while denying that either Scripture or the Church possesses infallible interpretive authority—a position that is internally coherent only if Scripture itself is understood as a purely human and fallible witness. While I share Küng's rejection of biblicist inerrancy, I have argued in The Splendor of Truth that "Scripture remains the normative witness to God's self-revelation; its authority is not negated by the historical mediation of its composition" (Asongu, 2026b, p. 167).

Küng in Light of CSR

From the perspective of CSR, Küng's importance lies in his demonstration that infallibility cannot serve as the foundation for ecclesial authority. He showed, definitively in my view, that the historical evidence undermines any claim that the Church has been immune from error in its official teaching. The Galileo affair, the reversal of teaching on usury, the development of doctrine on religious liberty—these are not anomalies that can be explained away; they are data that any adequate ecclesiology must accommodate.

However, CSR parts company with Küng in its insistence that the collapse of maximalist infallibility does not entail the collapse of all truth claims. CSR affirms, against Küng's implicit relativism, that truth is real, that reality constrains interpretation, and that the Church can teach authoritatively—even fallibly—about matters of faith and morals. The alternative to infallibility is not skepticism; it is disciplined fallibilism: the recognition that we may be wrong, combined with the institutional commitment to correction when error is identified.

As I have argued in Epistemic Sovereignty, "the alternative to infallible authority is not the absence of authority; it is fallible authority, accountable and corrigible. A Church that can admit error is a Church that can learn. A Church that can learn is a Church that can survive" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 173). This is the constructive project that Küng initiated but did not complete. CSR provides the philosophical framework for its completion.

Fallibilism and Critical Realism

Modern epistemology increasingly emphasizes fallibilism. Karl Popper (1963) argued that all human knowledge remains corrigible and open to falsification. Thomas Kuhn (1970) demonstrated the historical contingency of paradigms, while Michel Foucault (1980) emphasized the entanglement of knowledge and power.

Critical realism, especially through the work of Roy Bhaskar (1978, 1998), attempted to preserve realism without reverting to naïve certainty. My own framework of Critical Synthetic Realism builds upon but also extends Bhaskar's insights. As I have articulated in Critical Synthetic Realism, my framework is built upon three interdependent pillars: "a Critical commitment to fallibilism and self-correction, a Synthetic drive to integrate insights across disciplines, and a Realist metaphysics of a structured, multi-layered 'Conditional Reality'" (Asongu, 2026a, p. 45). CSR differs from relativism because it maintains that objective truth exists independently of subjective perception. As I explain, "Conditional reality does not mean that reality is conditional upon human perception; it means that human access to reality is always mediated, always partial, and always corrigible" (Asongu, 2026a, p. 91).

This position aligns with what Johnny Go (2018) identifies as "orthodox Catholic religious epistemology," which "subscribes not only to an ontological realism that permits the exercise of critical thinking, but also to an epistemic relativism that mandates it" (p. 45). Yet I depart from Go insofar as I emphasize the institutional dimensions of epistemic mediation more strongly than he does. In Epistemic Sovereignty, I argue that "knowledge is not a byproduct of civilizational success—it is its precondition" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 4). This claim applies to ecclesial institutions no less than to civilizational ones.

Liberation Theology and Institutional Critique

Liberation theologians such as Gustavo Gutiérrez (1988), Leonardo Boff (1985, 1986), and Jon Sobrino (1978, 1991) introduced structural critiques of ecclesial and social power. These thinkers emphasized that institutions may perpetuate injustice while simultaneously claiming divine legitimacy. The base ecclesial communities (comunidades eclesiales de base) that emerged across Latin America represented not merely pastoral innovations but theological events—a new way of being Church, one in which lay people read Scripture together, reflected on their experience, and organized for social change (Boff, 1986). Significantly, Boff (1985) himself faced Vatican sanctions for his writings on ecclesiology, a fate he shared with Küng.

I find liberation theology's methodological commitment to beginning with the experience of the poor to be indispensable. As I have argued in Beyond Doctrine, "the preferential option for the poor is not a sociological observation but a theological principle grounded in the character of God as revealed in Scripture" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 94). Yet I have also identified certain epistemological limitations within the liberation tradition. In Faith, Power and Emancipation (forthcoming), I argue that liberation theology's turn to Marxist social analysis, while providing important analytical tools, carried its own epistemological vulnerabilities. CSR shares liberation theology's suspicion of institutional absolutism while offering a more robust metaphysical realism and a broader epistemological framework.

Methodology: The Critical Synthetic Realist Methodology (CSRM)

This article employs the Critical Synthetic Realist Methodology (CSRM), an interdisciplinary and fallibilist approach I have developed within the broader framework of Critical Synthetic Realism. As I articulate in Critical Synthetic Realism, CSRM operates through several foundational principles.

First, CSRM affirms ontological realism. Reality exists independently of subjective perception, social construction, or institutional power. Truth therefore possesses objective grounding even when human access to it remains partial. As I state in Critical Synthetic Realism, CSR affirms "a mind-independent, stratified 'Conditional Reality' with emergent layers, grounding objective truth while rejecting both absolutism and relativism" (Asongu, 2026a, p. 45). In ecclesial terms, this means that divine revelation refers to a reality that transcends the Church's formulations of it.

Second, CSRM embraces epistemic fallibilism. Human knowing is always historically mediated, perspectival, and vulnerable to error. No individual, institution, or tradition possesses exhaustive epistemic mastery. In Critical Synthetic Realism, I describe this commitment to "radical fallibilism" as acknowledging "the provisional and corrigible nature of all knowledge claims to avoid dogmatism" (Asongu, 2026a, p. 119). Applied to ecclesial authority, this means that even the most authoritative doctrinal formulations remain historically situated and potentially revisable.

Third, CSRM emphasizes interdisciplinary synthesis. Theological claims are evaluated not only through doctrinal tradition but also through philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, and institutional analysis. In Critical Synthetic Realism, I argue that CSR promotes "integrative reasoning that bridges diverse disciplines, traditions, and perspectives, fostering multidisciplinary synthesis" (Asongu, 2026a, p. 145). This principle is particularly important for assessing infallibility claims, which have philosophical, historical, and institutional dimensions that cannot be reduced to dogmatic assertion alone.

Fourth, CSRM employs a hermeneutics of epistemic fracture. Human cognition and institutions are understood as wounded by distortion, ideology, power dynamics, and historical limitation. In The Splendor of Truth, I argue that "epistemic fracture is universal—not because all knowledge is equally distorted, but because all knowledge is mediated and all mediation is vulnerable to distortion" (Asongu, 2026b, p. 201). Consequently, claims to certainty require continual critical examination. This hermeneutic applies reflexively: my own claims about infallibility are themselves subject to the conditions of epistemic fracture.

Finally, CSRM rejects both relativism and absolutism. Truth remains objective and meaningful, yet human access to truth requires ongoing communal discernment, correction, and refinement. Within this framework, I examine the doctrine of infallibility not merely as a dogmatic assertion but as an epistemological claim concerning the conditions under which institutional actors may transcend ordinary human fallibility.

Discussion

Epistemic Fracture and Institutional Vulnerability

The doctrine of infallibility becomes philosophically problematic within CSR because CSR views epistemic fracture as universal. If all human cognition is vulnerable to distortion, then ecclesial institutions cannot simply be presumed immune from the epistemic conditions affecting humanity generally. As I argue in Epistemic Sovereignty, "the most durable form of dependency is the one that is internalized. When external paradigms become the default framework through which a civilization understands itself and its possibilities, epistemic sovereignty has been lost even if formal political sovereignty remains" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 91). Applied to ecclesiology, this suggests that when the Church uncritically internalizes a maximalist interpretation of infallibility—treating it as normative even when its historical and philosophical presuppositions are contestable—it may become epistemically dependent on a particular model of authority that is itself vulnerable to distortion.

Historical evidence reinforces this concern. The Church's historical entanglements with coercion, colonialism, scientific suppression, and institutional abuse demonstrate the vulnerability of ecclesial structures to distortion. In Fire from the Margins, I note that "the Church's historical entanglements with coercion, colonialism, scientific suppression, and institutional abuse" are not merely failures of individual moral character but "systemic distortions that emerged from the alignment of ecclesial authority with particular configurations of power" (Asongu, 2026d, p. 18). Even defenders of infallibility acknowledge that popes and councils have made prudential, political, and theological errors outside narrowly defined ex cathedra statements.

As Cardinal Newman himself observed regarding the loss of the Papal States following Vatican I: "The decision of July involved the dethronement of September" (cited in Oakes, 2009, para. 18). Even Cardinal Manning, perhaps the most maximalist defender of infallibility at Vatican I, was forced to adopt a more minimalist position when faced with Leo XIII's condemnation of the Irish rent strike—concluding that "pontiffs have no infallibility in the world of facts, except only dogmatic" (cited in Oakes, 2009, para. 19).

CSR therefore asks a deeper question: can any historically situated institution legitimately claim immunity from epistemic distortion without undermining the very fallibilism that characterizes human knowing? In Epistemic Sovereignty, I argue that "the fragility of civilizations often begins not with military defeat or economic collapse, but with subtle distortion in mediating structures. When incentives shift—when funding prioritizes ideology over inquiry, when prestige attaches to conformity rather than correction, when bureaucratic consolidation discourages risk—alignment begins to erode" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 179). This question becomes particularly acute in light of contemporary institutional crises. The sexual abuse crisis, failures of accountability, and resistance to structural reform have intensified skepticism toward centralized ecclesial certainty. Such crises reveal how institutional self-protection can distort truth-seeking processes.

CSR Against Epistemic Triumphalism

CSR fundamentally resists epistemic triumphalism. The assumption that an institution can speak with final and irreformable certainty risks collapsing the distinction between divine truth and human interpretation. In Beyond Doctrine, I argue that "doctrine becomes dangerous when it is treated as a possession rather than a witness—when it is sealed against history rather than tested within it" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 210). This critique echoes concerns raised not only by Küng but also by Francis Sullivan, S.J., who has carefully examined the limits of the ordinary universal magisterium's infallibility (Sullivan, 1983). As Germain Grisez (1985) notes in his review of Sullivan's work, the question of whether specific moral norms can be taught infallibly remains contested, with Sullivan arguing that "no specific moral norm can be taught infallibly" (p. 248).

I would agree with Sullivan's restraint while offering a more fundamental epistemological grounding for it. The problem is not merely that specific moral norms may exceed the proper object of infallibility; the deeper problem is that all human formulations—including dogmatic formulations—participate in the conditions of epistemic fracture. As I write in The Splendor of Truth, "Truth is not diminished by encounter; it is disclosed through it. Revelation does not hover above experience; it takes flesh within it" (Asongu, 2026b, p. 210). As Dulles recognized, "dogmas must be seen as human formulations of the Word of God, formulations not undialectically identified with the revelation they transmit" (cited in Oakes, 2009, para. 21).

CSR therefore does not deny revelation. Rather, it argues that revelation is always mediated through historically situated communities whose interpretive processes remain vulnerable to distortion. The Spirit may guide the Church without eliminating the historical conditions of epistemic limitation. In Fire from the Margins, I put this point succinctly: "The Spirit speaks through the whole people of God, not only through its official teachers" (Asongu, 2026d, p. 202). This is not a rejection of authority but a reconfiguration of it.

Continuing the Küngian Project: Toward a Constructive Fallibilism

Küng's work, for all its limitations, opened a path that CSR is now equipped to extend. Where Küng was primarily deconstructive, CSR is constructive. Where Küng's epistemology tended toward historicist relativism, CSR provides a robust philosophical framework for fallibilist realism. Where Küng offered only the vaguest sketch of a post-infallible ecclesiology, CSR articulates the institutional conditions for authoritative yet corrigible teaching.

The key insight that I take from Küng—and that I integrate into CSR—is that the Church's credibility depends not on its claim to immunity from error but on its capacity to acknowledge and correct error. As Küng (1971) wrote, "The Church is credible not when it claims to be without sin, but when it confesses its sins" (p. 189). This is not merely a pastoral insight; it is an epistemological one. In CSR terms, the Church's epistemic sovereignty depends on its correctability—its capacity to detect and revise error. Maximalist infallibility undermines correctability by making error acknowledgment institutionally costly. A Church that claims never to err in its solemn teaching cannot admit error when error occurs. The result is not truth but its opposite: institutional self-protection at the expense of epistemic integrity.

In Epistemic Sovereignty, I argue that "systems fail not because threats emerge unexpectedly, but because adaptive updating slows or ceases. Unpatched systems accumulate exposure" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 68). Applied to ecclesiology, this means that the Church's vulnerability to error and distortion increases when its teaching structures are insulated from correction. The doctrine of infallibility, in its maximalist interpretations, functions as an epistemic "patch" that prevents updating. The Church continues to operate—teaching, governing, administering sacraments—but its teaching drifts relative to the reality it purports to interpret. The gap between official formulation and lived faith widens. Credibility erodes.

The way forward, as I see it, is not the abandonment of authoritative teaching but its reconceptualization. The Church can teach authoritatively without claiming infallibility. It can claim the Spirit's guidance without claiming immunity from error. It can bind consciences without claiming that its formulations are the final and irreformable word on any subject. This is the constructive project that Küng initiated and that CSR is equipped to advance.

Synodality and Critical Ecclesial Realism

Recent developments in synodality offer a possible constructive alternative. Synodality emphasizes communal discernment, listening, reception, and participation rather than unilateral certainty. The 2021–2024 Synod on Synodality has brought these themes to the forefront of ecclesial discussion (Synod on Synodality, 2024). In Beyond Doctrine, I argue that "synodality is not a temporary initiative but a constitutive dimension of the Church. Walking together—listening, consulting, discerning—is the mode of being Church in a polycentric world" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 186).

From a CSR perspective, synodality is significant because it implicitly acknowledges distributed discernment, epistemic humility, and the communal nature of truth-seeking. Significantly, Küng's emphasis on the sensus fidelium finds its institutional expression in synodal structures. When the whole people of God are invited to participate in discernment, the epistemic burden is distributed, and the risk of centralized distortion is reduced.

However, as Dr. Joe Grayland (2024) cautions, the synodal process has shown "a concerning lack of rigorous theological examination of the liturgy—both its theological essence and its ritual execution—leading to debates and speculative discussions that hinder the Church's progress" (para. 4). He warns further against creating "a flawed equivalence" between Eucharistic and synodal assemblies, noting that "while linking synodality with the liturgy is invaluable, such parallels risk reducing the unique purposes of each" (Grayland, 2024, para. 5). I have noted similar limitations in my own assessment of the synodal process, observing that there is a "gap between the theological aspirations of synodality and its structural implementation" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 172).

CSR would reinterpret ecclesial authority not as domination over truth but as participation within a communal process of discernment guided by revelation and the Spirit. In Epistemic Sovereignty, I argue that "authority is not a property that resides in an office or a person; it emerges from relationships of trust, accountability, and mutual recognition" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 201). This position I have elsewhere described as "critical ecclesial realism."

Such a model affirms objective truth, the reality of revelation, the normative role of tradition, and the importance of ecclesial authority, while simultaneously recognizing historical development, institutional vulnerability, and the necessity of ongoing correction. As I state in Beyond Doctrine, "the Church is not a monolith; it is a communion. Coherence is not given once and for all; it is achieved through interaction. It requires constant attention, constant correction, constant conversion" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 204).

Infallibility Versus Indefectibility

CSR appears more compatible with the doctrine of indefectibility than with maximalist infallibility. Indefectibility maintains that the Church will not finally abandon the gospel, even though ecclesial actors remain historically fallible. This distinction—which Küng emphasized throughout his work—is crucial. CSR can affirm that the Church remains oriented toward truth, revelation continues to guide the ecclesial community, and doctrinal continuity possesses enduring significance, without claiming that every authoritative formulation transcends historical limitation.

In Fire from the Margins, I reflect on the distinction between living and dead traditions, arguing that "the distinction between living and dead traditions is precisely the distinction between open and closed epistemic systems. A living tradition sustains internal debate, tolerates dissent, and revises inherited assumptions when anomalies accumulate. A dead tradition preserves orthodoxy through institutional enforcement, treats critique as betrayal, and privileges coherence over correspondence" (Asongu, 2026d, p. 47). Maximalist interpretations of infallibility risk turning the Catholic tradition from a living tradition into a dead one by insulating it from the very contestation that keeps traditions alive.

Such a position aligns partially with Newman's (1878) developmentalism, Congar's (2011) ecclesiology, Rahner's (1981) historical consciousness, and contemporary synodal theology. It also aligns with Küng's insistence on the priority of indefectibility over infallibility. However, as I have argued in Epistemic Sovereignty, "the tradition remains rational only insofar as it remains permeable. Permeability requires institutions that protect dissent, reward revision, and distinguish the authority of argument from the authority of office. Without permeability, tradition becomes orthodoxy. Orthodoxy becomes closure. Closure becomes collapse" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 48).

A Constructive Proposal: Critical Ecclesial Realism

CSR offers a constructive alternative to both maximalist infallibility and relativist rejection of authority. "Critical ecclesial realism"—the term I use in Beyond Doctrine—would reconceptualize ecclesial authority along the following lines.

First, the Church is understood as a Spirit-guided community rather than an institution possessing juridical immunity from error. In Fire from the Margins, I write that "guidance does not eliminate the human conditions of knowing; it orients the community toward truth without guaranteeing exhaustive possession of it" (Asongu, 2026d, p. 210).

Second, doctrinal formulations are understood as authoritative yet revisable. They bind the community in the present while remaining open to future development and refinement. This position draws on Newman's (1878) insight that authentic development involves continuity through change rather than static repetition. In Beyond Doctrine, I argue that "doctrine becomes fire-tending rather than fire-policing. It guards memory without freezing it. It names truth without weaponizing it. It allows the Spirit to keep speaking in history rather than sealing revelation behind institutional glass" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 210).

Third, ecclesial discernment is understood as essentially synodal rather than purely hierarchical. Truth emerges through communal processes of listening, deliberation, and reception—though these processes themselves remain vulnerable to distortion and require critical scrutiny. In Epistemic Sovereignty, I argue that "synodality is not a replacement for hierarchy; it is a recontextualization of it. Authority remains, but it is exercised differently—through discernment rather than command, through listening rather than dictating" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 186).

Fourth, the category of epistemic fracture is applied reflexively to the Church itself. Ecclesial claims to authority, like all human claims, require ongoing examination for hidden distortions, power dynamics, and ideological elements. In The Splendor of Truth, I argue that "the most dangerous belief is not any particular falsehood but the conviction that one cannot be in error" (Asongu, 2026b, p. 275). This applies to ecclesial claims about infallibility no less than to any other claims.

Fifth, institutional humility becomes a theological virtue. The Church's fallibility is not a defect to be denied but a condition to be acknowledged and incorporated into ecclesial self-understanding. In Epistemic Sovereignty, I write that "civilizations that lose humility become rigid. Civilizations that lose standards become incoherent. The survival advantage lies in disciplined humility—confidence in realism combined with openness to correction" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 21). The same holds for ecclesial communities.

Potential Objections and Responses

Several objections to this proposal require consideration.

First, critics may argue that CSR's fallibilism undermines the very possibility of doctrinal authority. If all knowledge is fallible, why should any ecclesial teaching command assent? My response is that fallibilism does not entail skepticism. One can be rationally committed to a position while acknowledging its corrigibility. In Critical Synthetic Realism, I argue that "fallibilism, properly understood, contains two components: recognition of cognitive limitation and institutionalization of revision. The first fosters humility. The second preserves sovereignty" (Asongu, 2026a, p. 119). The Church can teach authoritatively without claiming infallibility.

Second, opponents may contend that Vatican I's definition forecloses the CSR position. However, as Dulles and Newman demonstrated, even within Catholic orthodoxy there exists room for non-maximalist interpretations. In Beyond Doctrine, I note that "the definition itself narrowly circumscribed the conditions for infallible teaching; extending it beyond those conditions represents a theological choice rather than a dogmatic necessity" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 145).

Third, some may argue that infallibility is necessary for ecclesial unity. Yet the Eastern Orthodox churches maintain unity without a centralized infallible office, and many Protestant denominations do so as well. In Fire from the Margins, I observe that "unity may be purchased at too high a price if it requires epistemic triumphalism" (Asongu, 2026d, p. 210). Küng made a similar argument throughout his work.

Fourth, critics may contend that CSR's emphasis on epistemic fracture is itself a form of Cartesian doubt that undermines religious faith. I reject this objection explicitly in The Splendor of Truth, arguing that "epistemic humility is not self-doubt in the absence of evidence. It is the structural recognition that access to reality is always mediated, always partial, always corrigible" (Asongu, 2026b, p. 275). The recognition of limitation does not require the abandonment of commitment.

Fifth, and most relevant to Küng, critics may argue that my position differs from Küng's only in degree, not in kind—that CSR is simply Küngian fallibilism dressed in philosophical jargon. I reject this objection as well. CSR parts company with Küng on the crucial question of truth. Küng's historicism tended toward the view that truth is what the Church teaches at any given moment—a position indistinguishable from conventionalism. CSR, by contrast, affirms that truth is what corresponds to reality, independent of ecclesial teaching. The Church may be wrong; teaching may err; truth remains. This is not Küng's position; it is a distinctively realist one that Küng's epistemology could not accommodate.

Conclusion

Critical Synthetic Realism introduces a profound challenge to triumphalist understandings of ecclesial infallibility. By emphasizing epistemic fracture, historical situatedness, and institutional vulnerability, CSR destabilizes claims to exhaustive ecclesial certainty while preserving commitment to objective truth and revelation. In Beyond Doctrine, I write that "truth is not diminished by encounter; it is disclosed through it. Revelation does not hover above experience; it takes flesh within it" (Asongu, 2026c, p. 210).

CSR does not collapse into relativism. Rather, it proposes a model of truth-seeking grounded in realism, humility, communal discernment, and historical consciousness. The Church remains a privileged mediator of revelation, but not an institution exempt from the epistemic conditions of human existence. In Fire from the Margins, I argue that "the fire from the margins does not threaten the Church. It exposes false securities, clarifies vocation, and reorders authority toward truth" (Asongu, 2026d, p. 4).

Consequently, CSR is more compatible with developmental theology, synodal ecclesiology, communal discernment, and ecclesial indefectibility than with rigidly absolutist models of infallibility.

The future of ecclesiology may therefore depend not upon abandoning truth claims but upon reimagining how truth is mediated through historically situated communities marked simultaneously by grace and fracture. In Epistemic Sovereignty, I conclude that "civilizations endure not because they are powerful, wealthy, numerous, or technologically advanced. They endure because they remain capable of knowing" (Asongu, 2026e, p. 173). In such a vision, the Church becomes not the possessor of exhaustive certainty but the pilgrim community continually seeking truth under conditions of epistemic humility.

Hans Küng, for all his limitations, was right about the central issue: the Church's credibility depends not on its claim to immunity from error but on its capacity to acknowledge and correct error. Where Küng fell short was in providing a positive account of how authoritative teaching could function without infallibility. CSR fills this gap. It provides the philosophical framework for a Church that teaches with authority, claims the Spirit's guidance, binds consciences—and remains corrigible, humble, and open to correction. This is the Church that Küng hoped for. This is the Church that CSR makes possible.

As I have articulated across my corpus, CSR draws influences from Aristotelian-Thomistic realism, Roy Bhaskar's Critical Realism, Karl Popper's fallibilism, phenomenological hermeneutics, and liberation philosophy (Asongu, 2026a). These diverse resources converge on a single insight: truth is real, truth is valuable, but truth is never finally captured by any human formulation. This insight, far from undermining Christian faith, actually honors the transcendence of divine truth that exceeds all human attempts to contain it.

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